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"SIT-IN" DEMONSTRATIONS:
ARE THEY PUNISHABLE IN FLORIDA?
RICHARD W. ERVIN*

AND BRUCE R. JACOB **

INTRODUCTION

The recent waves of "sit-in" demonstrations in the South raise many
new questions in all fields of law. The First and Fourteenth Amendments
to the Federal Constitution, as well as the Declaration of Rights of our
Florida Constitution, preserve to all Americans the inviolate rights to
speak, pray, assemble and seek a redress of grievances, and such rights
may not be lightly or unduly suppressed. They are the "rights of the
individual" in our society and stem from our basic concepts of liberty
and justice. And yet, there exist also property rights which are nearly as
precious to humans as are individual rights. In "sit-in" demonstrations
there is a conflict between these two types of rights, and the law must
ascertain and preserve a delicate balance between them. In addition, a
third interest must be taken into consideration - the desire of the community
or state to preserve peace and order.
Peaceful "sit-in" demonstrations are per se lawful, in the same way
that peaceful picketing or other forms of remonstrance are lawful and
constitutionally protected. However, when free conduct and the exercise
of individual rights infringe unnecessarily and unjustifiably upon property
rights or when the peace and tranquillity of society in general is threatened,
such demonstrations can be punished.
We have chosen to discuss and undertake to determine when and
under what circumstances a "sit-in" demonstration in Florida loses
constitutional protection and instead becomes criminal. To accomplish our
purpose we will examine three general categories of criminal offenses which
appear applicable, namely: (1) breach of the peace, (2) trespass, and
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(3) unlawful assembly. Our discussion will consist principally of Florida
Statutes, but since many relevant statutes incorporate common law definitions
of crimes, the article will deal also with some common law principles.
I. BREACH OF THE PEACE

A. The Common Law Definition
A breach of the peace is a violation of public order; the offense of
disturbing the public peace. The term is generic, and includes riotous
and unlawful assemblies.' Here are the necessary elements of the common
law offense: (1) conduct, actions or words (2) which are voluntary,
willful, intentional, unjustifiable and calculated to disturb public order
or tranquillity, 2 (3) which arouse and disturb some segment of the4
public," and (4) which constitute violence or directly and immediately
provoke or tend to provoke actual or threatened violence. 5
Disturbing and arousing the public does not mean causing mere
discomfort, annoyance or resentment; rather, the defendant's acts, words
or conduct must be such as normally cause alarm, consternation, disquiet
and disorder, and which threaten danger or disaster. 6 Actual violence is
not a necessary element of the offense; either actual or threatened violence
is sufficient to constitute the offense. In cases not involving open disturbances
in public places, and the actual annoyance of the public at large, personal
violence, either actual or threatened, is required before a crime has been
committed. 7 Actual personal violence is never a requirement. There must
be at least threatened personal violence to constitute non-public breaches
of the peace, but if the acts, conduct or words affect a larger segment
of the public, the necessity for personal violence diminishes in inverse
proportion with the increasingly public nature of the environ of the alleged
acts, words or conduct.8 The conduct or act cannot be criminal unless
it tends with sufficient directness to break the peace. By directness is
meant an immediate threat to public safety, peace or order; a mere
possibility that the act or conduct may produce or incite violence is not
1. Stewart v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 564, 568, 109 Pac. 243, 245 (1910).
2. State v. Mancini, 91 Vt. 507, 101 At]. 581 (1917); People v. Sustek, 124
N.Y.S.2d 641 (Magis. Ct. 1953).
3. Stancliff v. United States, 5 Indian Terr. 486, 82 S.W. 882 (1904); People
v. Perry, 265 N.Y. 362, 193 N.E. 175 (1934).
4. Webber v. Farmers Chevrolet Co., 186 S.C. 111, 195 S.E. 139 (1938); State
v. Thompson, 117 Vt. 70, 84 A.2d 594 (1951); State v. Steger, 94 W. Va. 576,
119 S.E. 682 (1923).
5. Wanzer v. State, 202 Md. 601, 97 A.2d 914 (1953); State ex rel. Thompson
v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 685, 188 S.W. 597 (1916); Woods v. State, 152 Tex.
Crim. 338, 213 S.W.2d 685 (1948).
6. People v. Chesnick, 302 N.Y. 58, 96 N.E.2d 87 (1950); People v. Ludovici,
13 N.Y.S.2d 88 (Westchester County Ct. 1939).
7. Ware v. Loveridge, 75 Mich. 488, 42 N.W. 997 (1889); State ex rel.
Thompson v. Reichman, supra note 5.
8. Ibid.
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sufficient to constitute a breach of the peace. 9 Whether or not a given
act or state of conduct amounts to a breach of the peace depends upon
the circumstances surrounding the act,10 and what may amount to a
punishable offense in one set of circumstances may not be a breach of
the peace in another time, place, and situation.
B. Case Law
Two United States Supreme Court cases in particular have clarified
the demarcation line separating First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms
from conduct constituting a breach of the peace; they are Cantwell v.
Connecticut" and Feiner v. New York.' 2 In the former, the defendant,
a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect, was convicted of the common
law offense of "inciting a breach of the peace." While on a street in a
predominantly Catholic neighborhood, he stopped two men who were
Catholics. He asked and received permission to play a phonograph record
and then proceeded to play the record, which attacked the Catholic
religion. Both men were incensed by the playing of the record and were
tempted to do violence to Cantwell. They told him to go away, and
on being so advised, he left their presence without being argumentative.
The conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court. Cantwell had
been on a public street, "where he had a right to be, and where he had
a right peacefully to impart his views to others."' The court pointed
out that the playing of the record had not disturbed nearby residents
and that it had not attracted a crowd or impeded traffic; the fact that
the hearers had been highly offended and angered was not sufficient to
make the actions criminal. The court observed that conduct, words or acts
likely to provoke violence can be a breach of the peace, even if no such
eventuality be intended and had the following to say with reference
to breach of the peace:
I]n practically all, [breach of the peace cases] the provocative
anguage which was held to amount to a breach of the peace
consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to
the person of the hearer. Resort to epithets or personal abuse is
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion
safeguarded by the Constitution .... 1
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily
harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal
abuse.'
9. State v. Thompson, supra note 4; State v.Steger, supra note 4.
10. State v. Stroble, 169 Kan. 167, 217 P.2d 1073 (1950); Jennings v. State,
92 Okla. Crim. 347, 223 P.2d 562 (1950); State v. Mancini, supra note 2.
11. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
12. 340 U.S. 315 (1950).
13. 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).

14. Id. at 309-10.
15. Id. at 310.
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The court opined that Cantwell could not be said to have committed
a breach of the peace in the absence of a statute narrowly drawn to define
and punish the type of conduct engaged in by Cantwell as constituting
a clear and present danger.
A decision which may have great influence upon future cases regarding
racial demonstrations is Feiner v. New York.' The defendant was arrested
under a statute which substantially embodied the common law offense
of breach of the peace, with some variations.' 7 Feiner made a speech
at a busy intersection in the city of Syracuse. He spoke from a box
located on the sidewalk. A crowd of 75 to 80 (mixed colored and white)
persons gathered around him, and some pedestrians had to go into the
street in order to pass by. Two policemen observed the meeting. Feiner
declared in an excited manner that Negroes did not have equal rights
and should rise up in arms. One man indicated that if the police did
not get the speaker off the stand, he would do it himself. The crowd
which consisted of both those who opposed and those who supported the
speaker, was restless. There was not yet a disturbance but the arresting
officer stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a fight. Having ignored
two police requests to stop speaking, Feiner was arrested. The United
States Supreme Court, in an extremely close decision, upheld the conviction,
saying:
[The courts below]

. . .

found that the officers in making the

arrest were motivated solely by a proper concern for the preservation
of order and protection of the general welfare, and that there
was no evidence .which could lend color to a claim that the acts
of the police were a cover for suppression of petitioner's views and
opinions. Petitioner was thus neither arrested nor convicted for
the making or the content of his speech. Rather, it was the
reaction which it actually engendered.'
This Court respects, as it must, the interest of the community in
maintaining peace and order on its streets. (Citations omitted.)
We cannot say that the preservation of that interest here encroaches
on the constitutional rights of this petitioner. 1
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections
of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker,
and are also mindful of the possible danger of giving overzealous
police officials complete discretion to break up otherwise lawful
16. See note 12 svpra.

17. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722. "Any person who with intent to provoke a breach
of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of
the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct:
1. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or
behavior;
2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive
to others;

3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on when ordered
by the police ..
"
18. 340 U.S. 315, 319-20 (1951).
19. Id. at 320.

1960]

6 "SIT-IN" DEMONSTRATIONS

public meetings. 'A State may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving
desirable conditions.' Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, [310 U.S.] at
308. But we are not faced here with such a situation. It is one
thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument
for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that,
when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or
persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless
to prevent a breach of the peace. . . .The findings of the state
courts as to the existing situation and the imminence of greater
disorder coupled with petitioner's deliberate defiance of the police
officers convince us that20 we should not reverse this conviction in
the name of free speech.
In the Colorado Supreme Court case of Flores v. City 6 County of
Denver,21 the following pertinent facts appear. Fifty to seventy people,
including the defendants, assembled in front of the Governor's house and
chanted in high-pitched voices for a redress of certain grievances. There
was no profanity or fighting and police received no complaints from
neighbors that they were being disturbed. The chief of police observed
the proceedings for ten minutes. Then he requested that the group
disperse. The defendants insisted upon the right to demonstrate for fifteen
more minutes, to which the chief of police reiterated his demand for
immediate dispersal. The defendants refused to comply and were placed
under arrest, for, among other things, violation of a "disturbing the peace
of others" ordinance. The court held there was no crime committed. They
said that the conduct of the defendants was neither violent nor threatening,
nor likely to produce violence, or cause consternation and alarm. No one
was disturbed, so there could be no "disturbance" of the peace. "[E]ven
if the ordinance be construed ...

to include breach of the peace generally ...

there must [at least be] a threat to the peace of the community. '22 The
court obviously felt that the conduct of the defendants could not constitute
a common law breach of the peace. The court discussed breach of the
peace cases involving fighting and wanton activities, then said:
In the situation here presented, we have another element, absent
from the cases hereinabove noted. The disturbance of which complaint was made in those cases was wanton and without worthy
purpose. In the instant case, the noise involved was incidental to
a legitimate right, protected by the Constitution, to appeal to
those in authority for redress of grievance by remonstrance, and
such right must be balanced against the right of the community
to peace and quiet. There exists the undoubted authority of the
state reasonably to limit the free exercise of the right of remonstrance, as well as of the free exercise of religion, and even of
the right of free speech itself, where they sanction incitement to
20. Id. at 320-21.

21. 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950).
22. Id. at 77, 220 P.2d at 375.
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riot or constitute an immediate threat to public safety, peace or
23
order, but such rights may not be lightly nor unduly suppressed.
In a 1947 New York decision, People v. Swald, 24 rendered by the
City Court of Utica, Swald, an independent taxicab driver, was told to
stop soliciting customers in the Union Station, which was private property
of the railroad. He disregarded the warning and came back to solicit
customers. A police officer told him to leave. He would not go, however,
and was placed under arrest for disorderly conduct, one of the necessary
elements of which was language, conduct or behavior intended to provoke
a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned.
The court held that no offense was committed, saying:
.. . [Diefendant's actions caused no crowd to collect nor was
any loud, offensive, insulting or disturbing language or conduct
employed by the defendant. 25
It is understandable that the refusal of the defendant to leave the
premises was annoying, disturbing and perhaps offensive to the
complainant as well as interference with the property rights of
the New York Central Railroad. It may well be that defendant
was a trespasser on the premises and could have been removed
by force if necessary....
It has not been shown in this case that the defendant had any
intention of breaching the peace. The record discloses no loud
or angry talk, no boisterous
or profane language, no physical violence
26
or threat to do so.

Thus, annoying, disturbing or offensive conduct does not necessarily
in and of itself provoke a breach of the peace. Violence, either actual or
threatened, is necessary.
C. "Sit-in" Demonstrations in Florida
The Florida Breach of the Peace and Disorderly Conduct Statute,
Florida Statutes 877.0 3,2T seems to embody the common law crime offense
of breach of the peace, and therefore, the cases discussed above are
applicable in this State. In light of these cases, we feel that a peaceful
"sit-in" demonstration cannot constitute a breach of the peace no matter
how much antagonism and resentment it might engender except in the
following situations:
23. Id. at 77-78, 220 P.2d at 376.
24. 73 N.Y.S.2d 399 (Utica City Ct. 1947).
25. Id. at 400.
26. Id. at 401.
27. FLA. STAT. § 877.03 (1959). "Breach of the peace; disorderly conduct.-Whoever
commits such acts as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals, or outrage the sense
of public decency, or affect the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them, or
engages in brawling or fighting, or engages in such conduct as to constitute a breach
of the peace or disorderly conduct, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to
punishment as provided by law."
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(1) The demonstrators, to the disturbance of some segment of the
public, engage in some form of violence, profanity, indecency, abusiveness
or discourtesy, which under the common law would constitute a breach
of the peace, provided that the other elements of the common law crime
are also present;
(2) Bystanders gathering to watch the "sit-in" demonstrators become
agitated to such extent as to create a clear and present danger of a riot
or breach of the peace and the demonstrators, although previously innocent
of wrongdoing, refuse to disperse upon demand of the authorities. It is
true that if the bystanders become abusive, profane, or violent, or if
their conduct tends to provoke violence, then they have committed crimes.
It is also true that the duty of police officers is to protect the demonstrators
in the exercise of their constitutional right to seek a redress of grievances,
but this does not mean that demonstrators may insist upon exercising that
right when to do so creates imminent danger of a riot or a breach of the
peace. The mere fact that the demonstration causes resentment among
bystanders, of course, cannot make the "sit-in" illegal. Nevertheless, if the
demonstrators refuse to desist from conduct which, although lawful under
ordinary circumstances, tends to create an imminent danger of a riot or
a breach of the peace, then we think that the Feiner 8 decision would
justify their arrest.
II.

CRIMINAL TRESPASS

A. Restaurants as Private Property;
Common Law Rights of Owners
In the case of Marsh v. Alabama,29 decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1946, the defendant was convicted for violation of an
Alabama statute after she attempted to distribute Jehovah's Witnesses
literature in a company-owned town, contrary to the wishes of the town's
management. The company had leased stores and business places in the
business block to merchants, and the federal government used one of the
places for a post office. The streets and sidewalks of the town were owned
by the company. In the stores there was posted a notice which read: "This
is Private Property, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or House
Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be Permitted."'8 0
The defendant came onto the sidewalk, stood near the post office,
and began to distribute the literature. She was warned to desist and was
asked to leave the sidewalk but did neither. An arrest and conviction
followed for the commission of the statutory crime of "entering or remaining
28. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
29. 326 U.S 501 (1946).
30. Id. at 503.
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on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so." 3'

The

defendant contended that to construe the statute as applicable to her
activities would abridge her right to freedom of press and religion contrary
to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the conviction was reversed, the
Court, through Mr. Justice Black saying:
.

.

. [I]t is the state's contention that the mere fact that all the

property interests in the town are held by a single company is
power, enforceable by a state statute,
enough to give that company
2
to abridge these freedoms.3

We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle
the question. The State urges in effect that the corporation's right
to control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the
right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests. We
cannot accept that contention. Ownership does not always mean
absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens
up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his
rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional
rights of those who use it.33

When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property
against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion,
as we must here, we remain3 4 mindful of the fact that the latter
occupy a preferred position.
Thus, to the extent that a private property owner allows the public
on his premises, his property rights become correspondingly less absolute.
However ,the Marsh v. Alabama rule has not been applied to privately
owned restaurants. Two recent federal cases and a Delaware decision hold
that, under the common law, an owner of a private restaurant may select
his clientele as he sees fit. All three, Williams v. Howard Johnson's
Restaurant,33 Slack v. Atlantic White Tower System, Inc.,36 and the
Wilmington Parking Authority 6 Eagle Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Burton, T
involved Negroes who complained that their constitutional rights were
violated by restaurateurs who refused to serve them. The court made the
following remarks in the Slack case:
In the absence of statute, the rule is well established that an
operator of a restaurant has the right to select the clientele he
will serve, and to make such selection based on color, if he so
desires. He is not an
innkeeper charged with a duty to serve
38
everyone who applies.
31. Id. at 503-04; ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 426 (1940).
32. 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946).
33. Id. at 505-06.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 505-06.
268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960).
157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960).
See note 36 supra at 128.
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B. The Common Law Crime of Criminal Trespass
At common law, no trespass to property was a crime unless it was
accompanied by or tended to create a breach of the peace, even though
the act was committed forcibly, willfully, or maliciously. Something more
than what amounts to a mere civil trespass was necessary; the peace had
to be actually broken or the act complained of had to tend directly and
manifestly to it, as when the acts were done in the presence of the owner,
to his terror or against his will. When a civil trespass was shown to be
attended by circumstances constituting a breach of the peace there was,
39
of course, no problem; the intruder was guilty of criminal trespass.
In the recent "sit-in" demonstrations, the conduct of the participants
has been deliberately non-violent; in fact the theory underlying the use of
such tactics seems to be based upon Ghandi's conception of passive
resistance.
Unless a demonstrator has previously been admonished by a restaurant
owner to remain off the restaurant premises, he is an implied invitee and
lawfully on the premises when he enters an eating place. As appears from
the above discussion of common law breach of the peace, particularly
from the Swald case,40 if A, while lawfully on the private property of B,
is asked by B to leave, and A refuses to do so, B may have the right
to forcibly remove A or to obtain police aid in ejecting A; but if A sits
quietly and engages in no offensive conduct other than quiet refusal to
leave, the courts find difficulty in holding that such conduct of A constitutes
a breach of the peace, which is an essential element of common law
criminal trespass. (However, as hereinafter pointed out, A's refusal to leave
after being so requested would constitute a statutory criminal trespass). The
element of violence, either actual or threatened, is indispensable to the
commission of the crime of breach of the peace.
C. Refusal to Leave as Statutory Criminal Trespass
Statutes, of course, can make civil trespass criminal. The case of

Marsh v. Alabama,41 involved such a statute. Florida Statute Section 821.01,42

provides another example. It is possible that under certain circumstances
Section 821.01 will be applicable to "sit-in" demonstrations. If a demonstrator
willfully enters into a private building (restaurant) which is occupied by
39. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 140 at p. 1101 (1954).
40. See note 24 supra.
41. See note 29 supra.
42. FLA. STAT. § 821.01 (1959). "Trespass after warning.-Whoever wilfully
enters into the enclosed land and premises of another, or into any private residence,
house, building or labor camp of another, which is occupied by the owner or his
employees, being forbidden so to enter, or not being previously forbidden, is warned
to depart therefrom and refuses to do so, or having departed re-enters without the
previous consent of the owner, or having departed remains about in the vicinity, using
profane or indecent language, shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding six
months, or by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars."
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the owner or his employees, being forbidden so to enter, or not being
previously forbidden, is warned to depart therefrom and refuses to do so,
or having departed re-enters without the previous consent of the owner,
then he may have violated this criminal statute.
D. The Florida Undesirable Guest Ejectment Statute
Florida has a law, Section 509.141, Florida Statutes, the pertinent parts

of which are set out below, 43 which allows restaurant owners, among

others, to eject undesirable guests. Being a criminal statute, it must be
strictly construed, and if a restaurant owner wishes to prosecute "sit-in"
demonstrators, he must follow the provisions of the statute step by step.
The manager, assistant manager, or other person in charge or authority
must orally notify the guest or guests that the restaurant no longer desires
to entertain him, her or them and must request that such guest or guests
immediately depart from the restaurant. In such case, the sitters will be
guilty of a misdemeanor if, after being so requested to depart, they remain
or attempt to remain.
What is meant by "other person in charge or authority?" Can this
phrase include waitresses? The answer is probably yes if the waitress is
acting on instructions from the management in such way that she can
be said to be "in. charge or in authority." The manager or other person
in charge or authority must notify the guest that he is no longer welcome
and must request him to leave the restaurant immediately if the statute is
to be operative. Merely refusing to serve the guest and/or closing a counter
or restaurant in the midst of a "sit-in" demonstration would probably not
be sufficient to constitute the demand to leave required by Section 509.141.
43. FLA. STAT. § 509.141 (1959). "Ejection of undesirable guests; procedure, etc.(1) The manager, assistant manager . . . or other person in charge or in authority in
any . . . restaurant [or other similar establishment] . . . shall have the right to
remove, cause to be removed, or eject from such . . . restaurant . . . any guest of
said . . . restaurant . . . who, while in said . . . restaurant . . . is intoxicated, immoral,
profane, lewd, brawling, or who shall indulge in any language or conduct either such
as to disturb the peace and comfort of other guests of such . . . restaurant . . . or
such as to injure the reputation or dignity or standing of such . . . restaurant . . .
or who, in the opinion of the management, is a person whom it would be detrimental
to such . . , restaurant . . . for it any longer to entertain.
(2) The manager, assistant manager . . . or other person in charge or in authority
in such . . . restaurant . .. shall first orally notify such guest that the . .. restaurant ...
no longer desires to entertain him or her and request that such guest immediately
depart from the . . . restaurant. ...
(3) And any guest who shall remain or attempt to remain in such . . . restaurant . . .
after being requested, as aforesaid, to depart therefrom, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and shall be deemed to be illegally upon such . . . restaurant . . . premises.
(4) In case any such guest, or former guest, of such . . . restaurant . . . or any other
person, shall be illegally upon any . . . restaurant . . . premises, the management,
of such . . . restaurant . . . forthwith and forceably, if necessary, to immediately eject
constable, deputy sheriff, sheriff or other law enforcement officer of this state, and
it shall be the duty of each member of the aforesaid classes of officers, upon request
of such . . . restaurant . . . fortwith and forceably, if necessary, to immediately eject
from such . . . restaurant . . . any such guest, or former guest, or other person,
illegally upon such . . . restaurant . . . premises, as aforesaid."
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III. UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY

A. Common Law Definition
The common law offense of unlawful assembly has recently been defined
as consisting of (1) the assembling together of three or more persons
(2) with a common design or intent (3) to accomplish a lawful or unlawful
purpose by means such as would give rational, firm, and courageous persons
in the neighborhood of the assembly a well-grounded fear of a breach
of the peace. 44 In line with this definition was Blackstone's statement that
an assembly for the purpose of doing an unlawful act without making any
motion toward the execution of their purpose could constitute the crime. 5
Intent, the purpose or design in the minds of those making up the
assemblage, is all-important to the commission of the crime; it need not
exist, however, at the outset but may be formed either at or after the
time of the assembly, and its existence can be inferred from language, acts,
conduct, and other circumstances involved in the alleged unlawful assembly. 46
B. Case Law
In State v. Butterworth,47 defendants were convicted under a statute
adopting the common law crime of unlawful assembly. During a strike by
silk mill workers near Paterson, New Jersey, the strikers attempted to
hold a meeting in Turn Hall to protest alleged police oppression against
strikers. The police refused to allow the meeting to be held in the Hall. To
protest this latest police action, 200 or 300 persons gathered in the public
square; a procession of about 30 marched from union headquarters to the
square, led by two young women bearing the American flag and followed
by the defendants. By the time the procession had reached the city square,
about 1,500 or 2,000 persons had gathered. Defendant Butterworth began
to address the crowd saying, "Fellow workers," whereupon he was interrupted
by police officers, who asked if he had a permit to hold a public meeting.
Butterworth, holding up a book in his hand, said, "This is my permit."
He was placed under arrest, to which he made no resistance but quietly
submitted. There was no evidence that any weapons were displayed at any
time. Two police officers testified that the attempted meeting put them
in fear that something might happen, but there was no evidence that
any other person was put in fear by the proceedings. The convictions of
Butterworth and others were under a statute which, on appeal, was held
to be to the same effect as the above quoted common law definition of
unlawful assembly.
44.
Appeals
Annot.,
45.
46.
47.

State v. Butterworth, 104 N.J.L. 579, 583, 142 Atl. 57, 59 (Errors and
1928); Shields v. State, 187 Wis. 448, 204 N.W. 486, 487 (1925); See
71 A.L.R.2d 875, 878 (1960).
Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 875 (1960).
Lair v. State, 316 P.2d 225, 234,,235 (Okla. 1957).
104 N.J.L. 579, 142 Atl. 57 (Errors and Appeals 1928).
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On appeal, the convictions were reversed. In reversing, the court,
speaking through Justice Kalisch, remarked:
It is rather startling to the most lively imagination that, if this
meeting was of such a turbulent and disorderly character as
described in the indictment, unsupported as it is, however,
by the proof, that out of forty policemen only two of them,
and they without stating any facts reasonably supporting any
ground of fear or alarm which would be entertained by a person
of a firm and courageous mind, were seized with fear of a
threatened outbreak and breach of the public peace.
[Tlhe object of the meeting was to protest publicly against action
taken by the police authorities which prevented the strikers from
holding their meetings to vent their grievances in a public hall.
The object of the meeting, therefore, was per se not an unlawful
one, and an indictment for unlawful assembly could not properly
be predicated upon the mere fact of holding the meeting in a
public place.48
A Puerto Rican case, Garcia Dominicci v. District Court,49 will also

show the reader what type of assembly is protected by the Constitution.
Defendants and other students constituting a throng of 500 gathered
together and marched toward the University of Puerto Rico to protest
certain acts of the Chancellor of the school. They made noises, including
whistling, jeering and uttering boisterous exclamations; and their conduct
obstructed traffic. Police tried to change their course to prevent them
from approaching the school and to ease traffic conditions; but the
demonstrators disregarded police demands, continuing to march upon
the University, Later most of the paraders sat in the street and on
sidewalks, completely paralyzing traffic for about half an hour.
The defendants were convicted under an unlawful assembly statute
prohibiting violent and tumultuous conduct. The court utilized the
Butterworth"° case's definition of unlawful assembly in construing the
statute. The convictions were reversed. The decision reads in part:
The nature of each act depends on the circumstances under
which it was executed. Perhaps if this very act had been executed
in a peaceful hamlet whose inhabitants were not used to the
excitement and noises, its peace and order might be disturbed.
But the events took place in the city of Rio Piedras which is
the seat of the University of Puerto Rico, with more than 5,000
students."'

[T]he right of the people to assemble for redress of grievances
may only be sacrificed when public order is actually threatened
and not52merely when it is conceivable that it may be slightly
affected.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 587-88, 142 At]. at 61.
71 P.R.R. 122 (1950).
See note 44 supra.
71 P.R.R. 122, 126 (1950).
Id. at 127-28.
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The decision seems to point out the importance of "climate" and
circumstances surrounding each alleged crime of unlawful assembly. What
is commonplace in a university city in Puerto Rico may create riots
and be punishable as unlawful assembly in Boston or in a non-university
town in Puerto Rico, for that matter.
Now let us turn our attention to cases in which convictions for
53
the crime of unlawful assembly were sustained. In People v. Anderson,
the defendants were all members of a Communist organization known
as the Trades Union Unity League. This League called a "demonstration
against unemployment," to be held in the Plaza, which was a public
square or park in the City of Los Angeles. Large crowds were gathered
on all the streets in the vicinity, blocking the sidewalks and even the
roadways in places. The defendants were all members of the League,
and had all come to take part in the demonstration or to speak.
One defendant was raised on the shoulders of other defendants. He
began to speak; he shouted, and the crowd shouted back. Police officers
started toward him and had to fight their way through the crowd. The
speaker shouted, "Don't let the police disperse us, don't let them arrest
our speakers, fight against unemployment." The noise was so great that
the police could not hear all that was said. When the police reached
the defendants, they told them to disperse, that they were disturbing the
peace and blocking traffic. The defendant refused to get down; and the
police proceeded to make arrests, in spite of resistance by all defendants.
Other defendants tried the same tactics at different locations, but
not all such groups resisted the police as did the first assemblage. Convictions
of all the defendants were upheld, under an unlawful asesmbly statute.
We quote from the opinion:
The defendants . . . were all acting in concert and with a common
purpose in so assembling . . . [Sol that whatever was done by
any one of them was in furtherance of their common design, and
hence . . . all 54were equally responsible criminally for the acts
of any of them.
Next, the court stated that one of the purposes of the assembly was
to resist by force any attempt to arrest or disperse the participants and
to commit a disturbance of the peace, that some of the defendants went
further than others in executing this unlawful purpose, but that their
guilt did not depend on the consummation of the purpose by all, or even
by any, of them. The defendants had evidently argued that they had merely
been resisting unlawful arrests. Apparently the court considered the gist of
the offenses to be that defendants refused to move or quit speaking when
warned by police that they were blocking traffic. The court said:
53. 117 Cal. App. 763, 1 P.2d 64 (1931).
54. Id. at 770, 1 P.2d at 67.
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While a speaker who is not himself obstructing traffic may not
always be criminally responsible for such obstruction created by his
hearers, yet when he refuses to move on request and insists on
holding his meeting at a place where his hearers are blocking
traffic, as in this case, he becomes at least an aider and abettor,
and a principal in the offense. 55
Koss v. State5 6 involved a situation in which approximately 200 persons
assembled in downtown Milwaukee to protest the arrival of German
ambassador Luther, holding signs such as "Luther agent of the bloody
Hitler." Police went among the assembled persons and commanded them
to disperse because they were blocking traffic. Defendants urged the
assembled persons not to move, and many of the latter, by locking arms,
closed in around the defendants and prevented police from dispersing
the assembly.
Defendants were convicted and the convictions upheld under a
Wisconsin unlawful assembly and riot statute, which was interpreted as
follows by the court: (1) an assembly originally for the purpose of doing an
unlawful act is punishable, as is (2) an assembly peaceable and lawful
at the outset, the members of which later make an attempt or motion
to do an act in either a tumultuous, violent, or unlawful manner, to the
terror or disturbance of others. 7
In the Koss case, the following instruction was held to be valid:
.'[T)he mere peaceable assembling of a large number of people
upon a public highway with no unlawful purpose is not itself
unlawful,' that 'if such assembly becomes of such a nature, or such
a number, that it in fact results in unreasonably obstructing the
use of the highway for public travel, or results in a trespass of
private property, it becomes unlawful.' 58
The court held that the defendants were guilty because they unlawfully
blockaded public travel and unlawfully refused to disperse when commanded
to do so by police officers.
C. The Florida Law of Unlawful Assembly
Florida's unlawful assembly statute, Section 870.02, Florida Statutes,59
includes assemblages of three or more persons "to commit a breach of the
peace, or to do any other unlawful act." The common law definition has
thus been broadened in this State. If it can be proved that three or more
"sit-in" demonstrators assembled with the intent or design, or after having
55. Id. at 772, 1 P.2d at 68.
56. 217 Wis. 325, 258 N.W. 860 (1935).
57. Id. at 326, 258 N.W. at 862.
58. Id. at 327, 258 N.W. at 864.

59. FLA. STAT. § 870.02 (1959). Unlawful assemblies.-"If three or more persons
meet together to commit a breach of the peace, or to do any other unlawful act, each
of them shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by fine
not exceeding five hundred dollars."
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been assembled formed the requisite common intent, to commit a breach
of the peace, as that crime has been delineated in Section II of this
article, then such demonstrators are guilty of the crime of unlawful assembly.
In Florida, in addition, if three or more "sitters" assemble with common
intent to do any unlawful act, they can be said to have violated Section
870.02. Therefore, if three or more demonstrators intend to commit the
crime of criminal trespass, which includes intended violations of the Florida
trespass and undesirable guest ejectment statutes, then such persons are
guilty of unlawful assembly, as that crime has been defined by the
Legislature of this State.
CONCLUSION

It appears to be a basic concept, well established by court decisions,
that demonstrations for the purpose of seeking an improved social, economic
and political status in our society are not to be lightly or unduly
suppressed. 60 At some point, however, individual rights and liberties, including the right to seek a redress of grievances, must yield to property
rights and to the necessity for peace and order in the community. A
"sit-in" demonstration is no exception to this rule.
If "sitters" enter a restaurant as implied invitees and are not thereafter
requested to leave by the owner or his agent, their mere presence does
not make them guilty of criminal trespass; if we assume that they have
assembled for the purpose of peacefully, non-violently demonstrating for
improved status in society, and if we assume that they have done nothing
that could be considered a breach of the peace or which could tend to
create a breach of the peace, they have not been guilty of any crime.
Under certain circumstances, however, discussed above, the demonstrators
may be guilty of breach of the peace, criminal trespass, unlawful assembly,
or a combination of them, under Florida law.
The mere fact that bystanders may resent a "sit-in" demonstration
does not make it illegal; in fact, if such resentment leads the bystanders
to commit a breach of the peace, they become guilty of a criminal offense.

60. Flores v. City & County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 220 P.2d 373 (1950);
State v. Butterworth, 104 N.J.L. 579, 142 Atl. 57 (Errors and Appeals 1928);
Garcia Dominicci v. District Court, 71 P.R.R. 122 (1950).

